Neutrality vs Equality vs Equity

In Logic in the Wild, I present logic as the guardian of coherence and compliment it for providing a “neutral space of dialectical enquiry.” Guarding coherence requires attention to structure and reasoning rather than belief and content. Engaging in a neutral space of dialectical enquiry is to focus on coherence rather than content when contemplating various perspectives on the same issue, alone or with others. Focus on how they reason, not what they believe. Being neutral means, in particular, that no one’s opinion or belief is imposed on the space, that no one is forced to accept as true what they don’t believe in.

Engaging neutrally requires the suspension of strong opinions and beliefs for the sake of the enquiry. If, when engaging with fiction, the audience is sometimes required to suspend disbelief, which means accepting things they wouldn’t accept in real life, such as superheroes, monsters, or interstellar space travel (do you believe in it?), suspending belief in a dialectical space is not similarly being more gullible, but rather suppressing one’s beliefs unless they can be justified and shared. If you want others to adopt a belief in a neutral space, you need to motivate and argue for it. How does it benefit others in the same space? How is it better for the group? And if others have views they want to support, hear them out with a charitable ear, seeking coherence and conciliation.

That’s the positive side of neutrality, that it allows us to play on an equal field, one in which everyone is treated equally. Equality, however, doesn’t guarantee equity. That’s true in real life, that even though we pretend that everyone has equal opportunity in society, only some achieve fair outcomes, sometimes because of luck and hard work, but most often because of their situation in society, which allows them to ignore or overcome barriers that stop others not similarly situated.

I believe the same can happen in a dialectical enquiry, that imposing neutrality without concern for fairness leads to an equal but non-equitable space. Some need to give up a lot more than others to enter that space, their voices get silenced because they can’t find a neutral way to express them, and their identity gets erased and so do the richness and wisdom of what they have to contribute. This can indeed happen deep in accepted standards of reasoning, which favor orthodoxy over difference by seeking equality, thus failing to achieve equity and fairness.

Neutrality Against Equality: A Dialectical Dilemma

In yesterday's post, I raised a question: does the neutrality or even impartiality of a dialectical space of enquiry necessarily lead to equality? This is a question worth delving deeper into. Let's consider this: How can a neutral and impartial dialectical practice possibly not treat its participants equally? Or, more specifically, how can such a practice fail to offer equal access to enquiry despite its neutrality and impartiality?

Initially, I treated neutrality and impartiality together to contrast them with the concept of equality, noting their distinct roles in dialectical spaces. It's crucial to distinguish between these terms to avoid potential misinterpretation. Impartiality primarily concerns the behavior and psychology of the interlocutors — their capacity to identify and mitigate their own biases and prejudices in judgment. It speaks more to the dynamics between individuals rather than to the inherent qualities of the enquiry space itself. Neutrality, in contrast, can be inherent to the space of enquiry itself, serving as a characteristic that emphasizes logical structure over content. This distinction underscores that while impartiality is about people and their interactions, neutrality is about the very nature of the enquiry space. Recognizing the importance of this distinction, my focus will be primarily on exploring the concept of neutrality and its implications.

The critical question then becomes: How can a neutral dialectical practice fail to provide equal access to enquiry? The type of neutrality in question here is that offered by logic, which involves abstracting from the content of beliefs or theories and concentrating on structure. As I argue in "Logic in the Wild," maintaining coherence neutrally means seeking good logical patterns in reasoning, regardless of content. Examples abound where arguments are logical, irrespective of whether their components are true or false. In theory, as long as the enquiry is predominantly logical, any content is permissible. This includes everything from ancient optics, which visualized beams emanating from the eyes to perceive the world, to alien abduction narratives, all of which can be as logically coherent as the most established modern scientific theories. How then does this not foster equality?

There are two key ways this occurs:

1. Insights from critical theory (encompassing feminism, queer theory, race theory, and post-colonial theory) suggest that societal biases are so pervasive and systematic that they lead practitioners to believe they are reasoning without assumptions, when in fact they are enforcing deep-rooted doxastic commitments in their dialectical enquiry.

2. Logic itself harbors inherent assumptions in the rules and laws it upholds, potentially creating a form of epistemic injustice by disallowing views that challenge these assumptions. A notable example from recent decades is the emergence of paraconsistent logics, which accommodate inconsistent theories. Orthodox twentieth-century logic equates inconsistency with triviality — an ultimate absurdity. However, scholars exploring indigenous philosophies have recognized that these worldviews often necessitate a tolerance for some inconsistency due to the conceptual spaces in which they operate. If a dialectical space of enquiry does not accommodate inconsistency due to its logical standards, despite claiming neutrality, it risks excluding alternative conceptual frameworks under the guise of triviality. This exclusion inevitably leads to inequality.

This issue presents a profound challenge. The rise of paraconsistent logics, which permit inconsistency, starkly contrasts with the orthodox view of twentieth-century logic where inconsistency was synonymous with triviality. This shift is significant, especially for scholars interpreting indigenous philosophies. These philosophies often require an acceptance of certain inconsistencies, which traditional logical frameworks might dismiss as trivial. If our dialectical spaces, governed by these orthodox logical standards, reject inconsistency, they inadvertently marginalize these alternative conceptual frameworks, perpetuating inequality.

Such a scenario illustrates a deep and ongoing problem in the field of logical enquiry: the potential for epistemic injustice rooted in the very foundations of logic. This is a dilemma that will continue to engage and challenge my thoughts for some time to come.