Neutrality Against Equality: A Dialectical Dilemma
In yesterday's post, I raised a question: does the neutrality or even impartiality of a dialectical space of enquiry necessarily lead to equality? This is a question worth delving deeper into. Let's consider this: How can a neutral and impartial dialectical practice possibly not treat its participants equally? Or, more specifically, how can such a practice fail to offer equal access to enquiry despite its neutrality and impartiality?
Initially, I treated neutrality and impartiality together to contrast them with the concept of equality, noting their distinct roles in dialectical spaces. It's crucial to distinguish between these terms to avoid potential misinterpretation. Impartiality primarily concerns the behavior and psychology of the interlocutors — their capacity to identify and mitigate their own biases and prejudices in judgment. It speaks more to the dynamics between individuals rather than to the inherent qualities of the enquiry space itself. Neutrality, in contrast, can be inherent to the space of enquiry itself, serving as a characteristic that emphasizes logical structure over content. This distinction underscores that while impartiality is about people and their interactions, neutrality is about the very nature of the enquiry space. Recognizing the importance of this distinction, my focus will be primarily on exploring the concept of neutrality and its implications.
The critical question then becomes: How can a neutral dialectical practice fail to provide equal access to enquiry? The type of neutrality in question here is that offered by logic, which involves abstracting from the content of beliefs or theories and concentrating on structure. As I argue in "Logic in the Wild," maintaining coherence neutrally means seeking good logical patterns in reasoning, regardless of content. Examples abound where arguments are logical, irrespective of whether their components are true or false. In theory, as long as the enquiry is predominantly logical, any content is permissible. This includes everything from ancient optics, which visualized beams emanating from the eyes to perceive the world, to alien abduction narratives, all of which can be as logically coherent as the most established modern scientific theories. How then does this not foster equality?
There are two key ways this occurs:
1. Insights from critical theory (encompassing feminism, queer theory, race theory, and post-colonial theory) suggest that societal biases are so pervasive and systematic that they lead practitioners to believe they are reasoning without assumptions, when in fact they are enforcing deep-rooted doxastic commitments in their dialectical enquiry.
2. Logic itself harbors inherent assumptions in the rules and laws it upholds, potentially creating a form of epistemic injustice by disallowing views that challenge these assumptions. A notable example from recent decades is the emergence of paraconsistent logics, which accommodate inconsistent theories. Orthodox twentieth-century logic equates inconsistency with triviality — an ultimate absurdity. However, scholars exploring indigenous philosophies have recognized that these worldviews often necessitate a tolerance for some inconsistency due to the conceptual spaces in which they operate. If a dialectical space of enquiry does not accommodate inconsistency due to its logical standards, despite claiming neutrality, it risks excluding alternative conceptual frameworks under the guise of triviality. This exclusion inevitably leads to inequality.
This issue presents a profound challenge. The rise of paraconsistent logics, which permit inconsistency, starkly contrasts with the orthodox view of twentieth-century logic where inconsistency was synonymous with triviality. This shift is significant, especially for scholars interpreting indigenous philosophies. These philosophies often require an acceptance of certain inconsistencies, which traditional logical frameworks might dismiss as trivial. If our dialectical spaces, governed by these orthodox logical standards, reject inconsistency, they inadvertently marginalize these alternative conceptual frameworks, perpetuating inequality.
Such a scenario illustrates a deep and ongoing problem in the field of logical enquiry: the potential for epistemic injustice rooted in the very foundations of logic. This is a dilemma that will continue to engage and challenge my thoughts for some time to come.
