Logical Injustice: A New Dimension of Wronging Reasoners

Epistemic injustice is to wrong someone in their capacity as a knower; hermeneutical injustice is to wrong them as an understander. What I propose is that logical injustice is to wrong them in their capacity as a reasoner. To wrong someone as a reasoner is to fail to appreciate the coherence in their thoughts. I want to discuss whether logical injustice is subject to the same problem as epistemic and hermeneutical injustice, namely that the injustice is neither genuinely epistemic nor hermeneutical, but rather reducible to prejudices and social injustice.

Kristie Dotson, for instance, distinguishes three levels of epistemic injustice, only one of which is genuinely epistemic; the other two are not because the reparation doesn’t require a change in the shared epistemic tools. It’s only when an injustice is propagated by the inertia of the dominant epistemic systems that resist change or accommodation that the injustice is genuinely epistemic. If the injustice is the historical exclusion of women from philosophy, the injustice is reducible to patriarchal injustice, not something specifically epistemological. Some women were given enough space to contribute to the growth of philosophical knowledge, and they could contribute without having to change or add to the dominant epistemological tools. Maybe a case like that is Émilie du Châtelet, who found a way to contribute to philosophy, not by changing how it’s done, but by breaking through the ranks. I’m simplifying here.

In contrast, I think a modern example of a proper epistemological injustice, one that is due to the inertia of the dominant theories, is the exclusion of trans people from contributing to knowledge. If I understand Dotson correctly, the exclusion is due to the resistance of established knowledge systems to change the conceptual space of sex and gender to appreciate the expression of alternative identities. Established epistemological tools can at best accommodate a trans person as being “both a man and a woman” or “neither a man nor a woman.” However, this is far removed from the knowledge, understanding, and reasoning that trans people have and can contribute, but aren’t allowed to because it doesn’t fit within the established epistemology. I believe this is what Dotson means by irreducible epistemic injustice due to the inertia of dominant epistemology.

Now that we can appreciate what irreducible injustice means, we can ask how epistemic, hermeneutical, and, what I wish to contribute, logical injustice, differ.

Reference: Dotson, Kristie. “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Social Epistemology 28, no. 2 (April 3, 2014): 115–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.782585.

Tracing the Social Pressure from Man/Woman to Male/Female

I've finally come to understand what it means to say that sex in humans is a social construct. This understanding now allows me to further explore and make sense of the social aspect of this construct, examining the roots of what we categorize as 'male' and 'female,' beyond the confines of biology. Yesterday, I discussed how societal pressures shape the scientific definition of sex, pressing it to align with what is observed at birth—the "eye-ball test." This doesn't dispute the existence of a biological definition of sex based on gamete production, but highlights a mismatch with societal expectations derived from observable physical characteristics at birth.

In my previous exploration, I highlighted how Pluto's reclassification was influenced by societal and scientific consensus within the astronomical community, underscoring the dynamic interplay between societal values and scientific categorization. Turning our focus to human race and sex, these concepts further exemplify the intricate relationship between societal constructs and scientific inquiry. The categorization of race, often based on visible traits such as skin color, presents a compelling case where the scientific community has largely found that such social categories do not align with clear-cut genetic or biological demarcations. This understanding is rooted in the recognition that human genetic diversity cuts across socially constructed racial lines, challenging the notion that race has a direct biological basis corresponding to these superficial observations.

Conversely, the discourse surrounding sex in humans reveals a different landscape. While societal norms have historically leaned towards a binary classification based on observable physical characteristics at birth, the scientific understanding of sex is far more complex, encompassing a spectrum of biological realities including chromosomal, hormonal, and anatomical variations. This complexity has prompted discussions within the scientific and medical communities about how best to reconcile this biological diversity with societal classifications. The conversation is not so much about forcing a scientific definition to fit societal observations but about acknowledging and respecting the breadth of human variation within scientific and societal contexts.

This exploration into race and sex underscores a broader theme: the influence of societal perceptions on scientific classification is nuanced and varies across different domains. While the scientific community strives to base classifications on empirical evidence and biological realities, societal constructs of race and sex demonstrate the challenges and negotiations involved in bridging scientific understanding with social perceptions. It highlights a selective engagement with scientific legitimization, where some constructs, despite lacking a strict biological basis like race, are recognized for their social significance, whereas others, like sex, are subject to ongoing debates about the intersection of biology and societal norms.

Where, then, does the drive to find scientific validation for the socially defined distinction between male and female come from? My working hypothesis is that it's rooted in the socially defined concept of gender. By differentiating 'male/female' from 'man/woman,' we ascribe a biological status to the former, acknowledging the latter as a distinctly social construct. However, the 'eye-ball test' employed by doctors at birth carries significant historical and cultural baggage. It embeds gender roles within a patriarchal framework and perpetuates stereotypes linked to activities and attributes like hunting and gathering, reason and emotion, labor and family care, as well as arbitrary color codes and interests such as blue vs. pink and space vs. dolls. This entire social package encoded in the man/woman distinction not only preserves existing social patterns but also sets clear expectations about who fits on each side of the dichotomy. This practice, seemingly effortless, lends an illusion of biological legitimacy to a construction that is, at its core, deeply social.

The pressure to fit individuals into these predefined categories places an enormous burden on the biological aspects of sex, such as gamete production, to uphold societal constructs and expectations. As we navigate the nuanced distinctions between male and female, man and woman, it's evident that the social constructs surrounding gender and sex are complex and deeply embedded in our culture. This journey sheds light on the intricate interplay between societal expectations and scientific categorizations, challenging us to reconsider our approaches to understanding human identity. Amidst this reevaluation, it's hard not to spare a thought for the gametes, unwitting participants in a societal debate far beyond their microscopic existence. There’s indeed a lot of pressure on those poor gametes!