In today's discussion, I want to discuss reasoning patterns that contribute to intersectional concerns. These concerns arise when the critical theory representing an oppressed group fails to encompass all members of that group. A classic example is how feminism, often led by white European cis straight women, is generalized to represent a universal voice for all women. However, what might seem like a rebalancing of power for white women does not necessarily address the additional axes of oppression faced by women of color, members of the rainbow community including trans women, women of different religions, and those living in societies with varying gender roles and structures.

Commonly, issues of intersectionality are discussed in terms of those who are excluded or further marginalized by theories purported to be universal. My approach this morning, however, takes a different angle. Instead of focusing on the excluded, I want to analyze the reasoning patterns that perpetuate this exclusion. While my examples will primarily pertain to feminism, similar patterns can be observed across other critical theories.

The reasoning patterns I am concerned with include symbolism, essentialism, and universalism. Symbolism in feminism manifests as gender symbolism, which involves ascribing sexual attributes to inanimate objects. This might sound vague, but let's consider some standard examples: blue is deemed masculine, pink feminine; beer is considered masculine, while cocktails are feminine; trousers are tagged as masculine, skirts as feminine, and so on. The problem here is straightforward—colors, drinks, and clothes are inanimate objects devoid of sex, and the symbolism assigned to them is a social construct that imposes attributes they inherently lack.

Essentialism similarly ascribes sexual attributes to things, but does so in a realist rather than symbolic manner. It posits that having sexual organs is essential to being classified as male or female, as well as possessing certain hormonal balances, chromosomal configurations, or gamete production capabilities. These characteristics are relevant to a biological understanding of sex, but the error occurs when gender roles and societal tenets about sex are reduced to these essential traits.

Finally, universalism involves generalizing the experience of a specific group to the entire population. The pitfalls of this approach are well-documented in statistical studies, where the representativeness of a sample group is crucial.

My critique is that symbolism, essentialism, and universalism are not only methodologically problematic individually but also compound to reinforce intersectional exclusion. Symbolism reflects attributes heavily influenced by one's society and is predominantly socially constructed, applying only locally. Essentialism, as discussed in another blog post, is also socially constructed and tends to erase or silence the lived experiences of many who do not fit neatly into essentialist categories. Finally, universalism often generalizes local theories to an entire target population without adequate consideration for diverse representation.

Together, these reasoning patterns do not merely exclude marginalized subgroups; they actively contribute to their further marginalization.