Logical Nihilism: Rehabilitating the Concept of Neutrality in Logic
And we're back to discussing logical nihilism. Let's explore whether logical nihilism can alleviate the tension at the foundations of logical thinking and the shortcomings of neutrality in ensuring equality within a dialectical space of enquiry. In the context of the philosophy of logic, 'nihilism' is a technical term. It's distinct from the general definition of 'nihilism,' which, according to my dictionary, means "the rejection of all religious and moral principles, in the belief that life is meaningless." Logical nihilism doesn't concern religious or moral beliefs.
My thesaurus first lists synonyms for nihilism as "negativity, cynicism, pessimism; rejection, repudiation, renunciation, denial, abnegation; disbelief, non-belief, unbelief, scepticism, lack of conviction, absence of moral values, agnosticism, atheism, non-theism." The second batch of synonyms includes "anarchy, disorder, chaos, absence of government, lawlessness, mobocracy." Both sets of terms paint nihilism in a rather negative light, something humorously portrayed in The Big Lebowski. None of these seems directly relevant to addressing issues of equity in dialectical spaces. However, it's this second set that brings us closer to understanding logical nihilism, not through the concept of anarchism, which tends to inflate egotism, but rather through the idea of lawlessness. Logical nihilism posits that there are no inherent laws of logic. Each time I mention this, I instinctively wonder: “But what remains of logic if there are no laws?” considering logic is fundamentally about “the laws of thought.” This concept is deeply ingrained, asserting that logic is universally applicable, its laws holding true regardless of context, implying its neutrality.
Embracing logical nihilism means challenging the very idea that logic is neutral. But in my work, "Logic in the Wild," don't I argue that logic facilitates a neutral space for dialectical enquiry? Indeed, because logic excels at this! However, I don't assert that this space remains identical across all dialectical endeavors. Logic, acting as the guardian of coherence, applies different standards in varied contexts. In mathematics, 'consistency' measures coherence, while 'beyond reasonable doubt' sets the standard in legal proceedings. Meanwhile, probability and statistics play a crucial role in guiding policy-making, particularly in fields such as public health and economics. Thus, each context demands a unique measure of coherence, leading to distinct interpretations of neutrality.
Contrary to the belief that there's a singular, all-encompassing logic, logical nihilism advocates for a more flexible approach to logical practice, allowing for nuanced expectations regarding neutrality. By accepting the negotiability of neutrality at the core of our thinking, we reopen the possibility of addressing issues of equity. Far from being a radical rejection of logic as meaningless, logical nihilism invites us into richer, more constructive dialectical spaces of enquiry. It encourages participants to engage more deeply and constructively. That, at least, is my hope.
